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> Case No. 880135-CA 
) Category No. 14.B. 
) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant/third-party plaintiff/appellant, Jack C. 
Daniels, by and through his attorneys of record, Gordon A. Madsen 
and Robert C. Cummings, hereby petitions for rehearing pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, attorneys of 
record for petitioner, Jack C. Daniels, hereby certify that this 
Petition is presented in good faith, and not for delay. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter was 
entered April 5, 1989. 
This petition is made within fourteen days of the said 
entry of Decision and is therefore timely. Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson, judge of the Court of Appeals, wrote an opinion. In 
addition to Judge Davidson's rationale, the opinion contains the 
following language at the end thereof: "Therefore, the summary 
judgment in favor of Deseret is affirmed." 
Judge Regnal W. Garff and Judge Norman H. Jackson 
"concurred" only in the result. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH THE PETITIONER 
CLAIMS THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED: 
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS 
MATTER DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 30(c), RULES OF UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
Rule 30(c), Rules of Utah Court of Appeals provides: 
"When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, 
modified, or affirmed by the court, the reasons therefor 
shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the 
clerk. Any judge on the panel concurring or dissenting 
therefrom may likewise give the reasons in writing and 
file the same with the clerk. . . " (Emphasis added.) 
Said rule therefore requires that the reasons for the 
decision be stated. The opinion written by Judge Davidson is in 
effect a minority opinion as the majority of the court do not 
concur in the "reasons stated" by Judge Davidson, but only in the 
result. We respectfully submit that it is not proper for the 
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majority of the court to concur in the result and thereby avoid 
writing an opinion setting forth their reasons. It is impossible 
for petitioner to point out to this court as required by Rule 
35(a) "with particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended" 
when the views of the majority of the court are never set forth. 
Petitioner will nevertheless point out the points of law and fact 
in Judge Davidson's minority opinion with which petitioner takes 
issue and in which petitioner feels Judge Davidson has erredf but 
it is in a sense a meaningless exercise to take issue with a 
minority opinion. The majority of the court can read our 
arguments and say in effect, "So what, we didn't agree with him 
either." We respectfully submit that when a party is deprived of 
in excess of $80,000 a sense of fair play requires that the court 
tell him why. Appellant has raised bona fide and substantial 
issues which should be addressed by the court. We respectfully 
submit that the court should set forth as required by law the 
reasons for its decision. 
We respectfully submit that if the two concurring 
members of the court were in agreement as to the reasons for 
denying Daniels1 appeal, their reasons should be set forth in 
writing as the majority opinion of the court. If their reasons 
differed from the reasons set forth by Judge Davidson, which one 
must assume in this case, and their reasons also differed from 
each other, then we submit that both should have set forth those 
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reasons, but in any event one member of the court would have to do 
so in order to have the reasons of the court (majority) set forth 
in writing. We respectfully submit that anything less than that 
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 30(c) that "reasons 
be set forth in writing." The word "reasons" can only mean the 
reasons of the majority of the court, meaning the reasons of at 
least two of the members of the three-judge panel. 
We respectfully submit that for the majority to fail 
to state its reasons is a very unfortunate omission in the proper 
administration of the law. It conveys a bad image, not only to 
the unfortunate recipient of such decision, but to the public in 
general. It gives the unfortunate and false impression that the 
law is arbitrary and unreasoned. It gives the impression that all 
men are not after all equal before the law. It gives the 
impression that some men get the benefit of the full and careful 
application of the law to their problem, but that others, for no 
stated reason, do not. 
This case is not trivial. It presents substantial 
issues. It involves a considerable sum of money. It deals with 
matters of first impression in Utah and of great moment to the 
building industry. We respectfully submit that Daniels is 
entitled to a reasoned opinion by a majority of this court. 
POINT II. AS THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT HAVE NOT 
INDICATED REASONS FOR THEIR DECISION, APPELLANT IS LEFT WITH NO 
RECOURSE BUT TO ASSUME THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT OVERLOOKED 
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OR MISAPPREHENDED ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY APPELLANT IN HIS 
TWO BRIEFS HERETOFORE FILED HEREIN, AND ACCORDINGLY THOSE POINTS 
ARE REASSERTED AT THIS POINT AND THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
ADOPTED AT THIS POINT. 
The foregoing is not intended to be disrespectful to 
the court in any way, but where the majority of the court have 
not indicated their reasons, it is impossible to state with 
"particularity" as required by Rule 35(a) what the majority 
"overlooked" or "misapprehended." 
Daniels1 basic points on appeal were two in number, to-
wit: (1) That the work done in December 1981 at the request of 
the owner was sufficient to extend his lien rights, or at least 
that an issue of fact exists precluding summary judgment; and (2) 
that the owner is estoppped by his conduct from asserting a late 
lien filing on the part of Daniels, and those taking from the 
owner with notice (namely Deseret) are likewise estopped. 
The arguments in support of those points are set forth 
in the two briefs filed in this court by Daniels, and Daniels 
could point to those parts of said briefs which the majority 
overlooked or misapprehended if known to Daniels, but in the 
absence of reasons, Daniels can only adopt said arguments in full 
at this point. As it would be unduly burdensome to literally 
incorporate those arguments in full in this brief, they are 
adopted by reference. 
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POINT III. JUDGE DAVIDSON'S DETERMINATION IN HIS 
MINORITY OPINION THAT THE $80,000 SOUGHT BY JACK DANIELS THROUGH 
HIS LIEN WAS FOR "PROFITS OWED TO HIM AS A LIMITED PARTNER" IS 
WHOLLY ERRONEOUS AND UNJUSTIFIED. 
In his opinion Judge Davidson mischaracterized the 
claims of Daniels in the first paragraph of his opinion by stating 
that "Daniels1 claim concerned the timeliness of filing his notice 
and the profits owed to him as a limited partner in Park Avenue 
Development Company." (Emphasis added.) 
Daniels has never claimed any lien rights by virtue of 
monies owed to him as a limited partner. To so state makes Judge 
Davidson's opinion appear plausible, but there is no basis for it 
in this action. 
Judge Davidson's opinion at page 3 correctly states the 
standard of review as follows: "However, [o]n appeal from a 
summary judgment, we review the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the losing party." We respectfully submit that Judge Davidson 
does not in fact so view the evidence in this case. Otherwise he 
could not have reached the foregoing conclusion. In the first 
place, Daniels is appealing from the granting of a Motion to 
Dismiss. The respondent never even filed an answer, and there 
never has been an evidentiary hearing in this matter. In order to 
rule against Daniels, the court must determine that as a matter of 
law his Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Plaintiff's Third-party Complaint does not ask for 
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"profits owed to him as a limited partner." The Third-party 
Complaint directed against Deseret, which is the subject of this 
appeal, states that Daniels has a lien superior to any interest 
of Deseret and seeks forclosure of that lien as a superior lien to 
that of Deseret. The lien itself nowhere uses the term "profits." 
The lien itself says that Daniels is seeking a lien for $80,253 
"owing to the undersigned for Construction of Eight-Plex 
Condominium as a General Contractor." The lien goes on to state 
when the first labor and materials were furnished and when the 
last were furnished, and also states that Daniels 
"did furnish labor amounting to the sum of $80,253.00 
Dollars, which was the reasonable value thereof, and on 
which the following payments have been made to-wit: NONE 
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $80,253.00 
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets." 
There can be no. question that the pleadings state a good 
cause of action. 
The Building Contract Agreement itself says in Article 8 
thereof as follows: 
"It is hereby mutually agreed between the parties hereto 
that the sum to be paid by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY to the CONTRACTOR for said work and materials 
shall be $797,000 . . . plus profit and overhead of 
$80,253.00 . . . " (Daniels1 deposition, May 13, 1982, 
Exhibit 4, page 4.) 
The operative words there are that it is to be paid to 
the "contractor" for "work and materials." This is nothing more 
than a provision for a cost-plus contract, and a cost-plus 
.contract is generally held to be fully lienable, both for the out-
of-pocket and the profit and overhead at least where the work is 
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actually done. If a contractor does not perform, he cannot 
perhaps get profit and overhead, but if he does perform, it 
becomes an integral part of the reasonable value of the labor and 
materails. A builder who works for out-of-pocket only cannot stay 
in business long. See 53 Am Jr 2d, Mechanics Liens, Section 107. 
Our lien law does not provide that a contractor can only recover 
his out-of-pocket costs. He is entitled to the reasonable value 
of materials and his services, which includes what he has to 
actually pay for materials and labor and his profit and overhead. 
If the contract is deemed to be vague, then Daniels is 
entitled to his day in court to present parol evidence as to what 
the intention of the parties was. 
Even Deseret has never asserted as a separate point in 
its brief or otherwise th^t the amount sought by Daniels was for 
profits as a limited partner. It is not true that Daniels as an 
individual was to receive a profit as a limited partner. It must 
be noted that the Building Contract Agreement is between Jack 
Daniels and Park Avenue Development Company. Daniels1 "invest-
ment" rights were not in his own name, but rather he was a member 
of JML, a separate Utah limited partnership, and by virtue of his 
membership in JML he was to have received a profit from the joint 
venture in addition to compensation as general contractor. (See 
page 69, 70 of Daniels Deposition in Appendix hereto.) 
At pages 10 to 13 of Daniels1 deposition he makes it 
clear that he and three others formed a limited partnership called 
-8-
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li v - written opinion inflicts upon Daniels a gr^at 
injustice by holding that the compensation due to him as the 
general contractor on the job cannot as a matter of law be 
segregated from money which might be due to a limited partnership 
of which he is a member. Such a holding overlooks the following: 
1. There is no investor profit payable to JML or 
anyone until the expenses of $797f000 for work and materials is 
paid and the $80f253 is paid to Danielsf along with all other 
expenses payable by Park Avenue Development Company. Until then, 
there is no way of knowing what the total profit is that is to be 
divided among all those entitled to it. There is no way the 
parties could, and they obviously did not, fix Daniels1 share of 
investment profit in advance at the fixed figure of $80f253. 
2. If $80,253 is Daniels1 investor profit, what do the 
other members of JML get as their profit? 
3. Do Daniels,1 associates in JML get the same as 
Daniels without having to take any responsibility for construction 
of the building? If so, does the court rewrite their agreement? 
If Daniels is entitled to more than his fellow partners in JML, 
then it is because of the work he did and not because of the money 
he invested, and that amount is payable to him for work performed 
on the building and is clearly lienable. 
4. What does "overhead" include? The court cannot say 
overhead is not lienable as a matter of law, without knowing what 
it is. 
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The opinion of Judge Davidson states on page 5, "We do 
not need to reach the merits of the estoppel argument even if 
Daniels had filed a timely notice for the $80,000 owing to him for 
•profit and overhead.1 This amount was not owed to him for the 
value of the services he rendered or the materials furnished but 
from his ownership in Park Avenue as a limited partner." 
Footnote 1 on that same page contradicts the foregoing: 
"It is undisputed that approximately $15,000 would pay 
Daniels for his services as contractor. What the 
'overhead1 represents is unclear. In any case, failure 
to properly preserve the lien right precludes any claim 
that this overhead should be the subject of a lien." 
This footnote is significant in two respects. First of all, Judge 
Davidson admits that he does not know what "overhead" means. That 
alone is sufficient basis to remand the case for trial to let the 
appellant explain what overhead means. If overhead was a 
legitimate expense of construction, then Judge Davidson's 
conclusion that Daniels is only seeking profit as an investor is 
refuted. How the court can acknowledge an ambiguity such as "what 
does overhead mean" and then rule as a matter of law against 
appellant is difficult to understand. 
Furthermore, Judge Davidson apparently is doing in 
footnote no. 1 what he declines to do in the body of the opinion. 
Judge Davidson says that we do not have to determine estoppel, and 
then in the footnote assumes that Daniels' lien was untimely, 
which by implication rejects the estoppel argument. The phrase 
"properly preserve the lien right" can only refer to timeliness as 
-12-
no other def^e" * - i^r* n.is ever be^ -' assert-pd -^r ^ . /_. . 
ava . aoi- : mechanic'- i ler: Cdsei wr JOL' ev-r nscussirc uhe 
issue. 
P ; • • , : • : : 
HE STATES ON y*G~ 2 UNDER " F A C T S : " I'HE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
APE KOXLMArEL. ; . iH; -oK iJ i . ; ^liAK, ; * ' •.!:.: r 'KOFM\S FROM I - E 
S A L , Of THF uMDOMTNlVM -^ *k OVERHEA P ! n ) h a s i = . a d d e d . ) 
T • ^ ' 
s t a t e s th'a1- i ^ i --1 s i - * o r,< : - i i J r r . v * - -5 J 1 •.=•- o * > 
c o n d o m i n i : r ' n d ^ # r ^ c o u U a c L n e J .S LU L - T" - " - ^ • : u n " 6 0 
c l i , j i - , r ; J . T L _ , h i ^ wo^k a s g e n e r a l J „ t ; ^ " . n r . 
J u d a - L M V I ' J * r ' s a s s e r t i o n 10 2 *:<a* " F a r - A v e n g e 
a I : i * - -
^ o - J K . JI -:I. I O J ^ C L . d n u a q r - - u 1 ^ -j J u L r o A i m a t e l y ^ 3 , 0 0 0 
r o r : :- s e r v
 t - q a i , ~ , * i r ^ ' i r n t ^ , - v - - - . a a reemer* w m 
^ e s r • - • 'T. ^ •' ... 
r,\ . l m e i b ^ ^  - o m s e i ! . r e f i e c t b e c a u s e no w a s * •>- ^ o r t r a t o r -<n-J 
c o u l d ^ 1 r*--* p ^ o n 1 *- t r* w<. r^ ^ ^-- + ,. "f MO ' ' * n *• * i ' ^ + t - r^^ 1 ' " ^d "• m 
1
 : • - 1 - : - s e 
, . r - j r - 1 > s ^ . m s e l f a : o n e o f t h e i r u He p r f o r m e d c ^ r * a i r - e r v i : e s 
ex' ' • ' "
f
 161 i d D ^ " ' , v * •' ^
 r ~ — ;•—— - - , , .y 
o p o o r e r w o . , , .
 %); t r i e 
$80f000f it would only serve to reduce the balance owing, not 
eliminate it. 
POINT VI. THE WORK DONE DECEMBER 1 WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
EXTEND PLAINTIFF'S LIEN RIGHTS. 
Although it was not dispositive in Judge Davidson's 
analysis of this case, he nevertheless discussed at some length 
the issue of work done on December 1 by Daniels as extending his 
lien rights. We respectfully submit that Judge Davidson's opnion 
misapprehends that point. The point was that Daniels did not go 
back on his own on some "pretext." Daniels was called back 
himself because the owners asserted that he had not completed the 
job. He went back because he was required to go back and 
undertook the job he was given and, although he did not get very 
far with it before he was, discharged, that is not the issue. A 
journey of 1,000 miles begins with one step, and the fact is that 
Daniels undertook the work he was requested to do, and correcting 
massive water damage from allegedly defective work was certainly 
extensive. The exact amount thereof was never determined as a 
Motion to Dismiss was granted, and there has never been a trial to 
determine the extent of the work done to repair the water damage. 
Nevertheless, we respectfully submit that where Daniels undertook 
a project, which project was substantial, the fact that he was 
terminated before he has done much does not make his work 
insubstantial. We respectfully submit that "insubstantial" refers 
to the job that needs to be done, not to the period of time which 
-14-
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ADDENDUM 
EXAM BY KINGHORN 
MOST ALL OF MY WORK HAD BEEN DONE AS AN I N D I V I D U A L . 
AMD OF COURSE MIKE AND LARRY HAD MORE KNOWLEDGE IN THIS SIDE 
OF THE SPECTRUM THAN I HAD, SO I D I D N ' T KNOW HOW TO APPROACH 
I T . 
MIKE AND LARRY KNEW HOW TO APPROACH I T , AND SO 
WE FORMED A CORPORATION AND A L IM ITED PARTNERSHIP I N WHICH 
TO ENTER INTO OUR AGREEMENT WITH PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME HOW MUCH INVESTMENT VANCE MCDONALD 
WAS PROPOSING THAT YOU MAKE OR WAS ASKING O R - - . 
A WE BOUGHT 20 PERCENT OF THE PROJECT FOR $8 0 , 0 0 0 , 
Q HOW DID THAT $8 0 , 0 0 0 FIGURE COME ABOUT? 
A THIS WAS WHAT THEY OFFERED US, 20 PERCENT OF — I MEAN 
THIS WAS THE COST THAT THEY OFFERED US; 20 PERCENT OF THE 
PROJECT FOR $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 
Q SO YOU AND MR.,DANGERFI ELD AND MR. L INNELL GOT 
TOGETHER AND FORMED SOME SORT OF A--SOME SORT OF AN ENTITY 
OF SOME KIND? 
A WE FORMED A CORPORATION, M I L A J A K . THAT WAS TAKEN 
FROM MIKE AND LARRY AND MY NAME. 
Q OKAY. WHAT WAS MILAJAK SUPPOSED TO DO IN THE 
PROJECT? 
A WELL, I D O N ' T - - 1 MEAN I TOLD YOU JUST PART OF I T . 
r
 dUc.;7 —YOU KNOW, I ' M A CARPENTER AND THAT SIDE OF I T I KNOW, 
( i BUT T-llS OS HER SIDE ! WOULD HAVE TO, YOU KNOW, L E A V E - - I REALLY 
|j DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THAT STRUCTURE I S . 
Gt.Nt RAl. COJHT M:PCRTt!\S 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
17 
18 
ji 
19 l! 
i I 
20 |'| 
Ej. 
iQN 
I .Newhouse Cuiioing 
I Salt Lake C.!y, Utaft 84111 
5 0 0 A T E S | iSC i) 363-2000 
MANAG.'NG PAH T.N £M 
'iirri 2? IWdgiey, RPR 
8 
9 
10 
li 
qgpr 
EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Ij Q WHAT ABOUT JML ? WAS THERE SOME KIND OF A 
li PARTNERSHIP OR SOMETHING PUT TOGETHER CALLED JML? 
ji 
jl A RIGHT. THAT WAS IN RESPECT TO THE CORPORATION. 
Ij 
i! IT WAS — W H A T LITTLE I REMEMBER--IT WAS THAT WE NEEDED A ' 
I; 
If LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO GO INTO THE — Y O U KNOW, A3 A JOINT 
| j 
jl' VENTURE. " 
\\ 
II 
l\ NOW, I'M NOT SURE I RIGHT KNOW THAT I UNDERSTAND 
ij 
ii 
!j WHY OR--WITHOUT WORDS. 
l! 
»i Q DID YOU EVER RECEIVE ANY PAPERS FROM MR, DAMGERFIELD I 
|| OR MR. LINNELL REGARDING THE FORMATION OF MILAJAK? 
i j 
A WELL, VERN ROMNEY WAS OUR ATTORNEY. WE APPROACHED 
VERM. he DREW UP ALL THESE PAPERS FOR US AND RECORDED THEM. 
NOW, THIS IS ALL I CAN TELL YOU. WHETHER VERN WAS THE ONE 
THAT RECORDED THEM OR NOT, HE DREW THEM UP. 
Q OKAY. WAS THAT JRUE OF JML PAPERS, TOO? 
A YES, 
Q DID YOUR AGREEMENT WITH MR, DANGERFIELD AND MR. ' 
LINNELL REQUIRE THAT YOU PUT UP A CERTAIfJ AMOUNT OF CASH, 
AND MR, MCDONALD PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT Or CASH, AND MR. 
LINNELL PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH? 
A WELL, I DON'T KNOW ABOUT MCDONALD. WE--. 
MR. MADSEN: I THINK YOU MEANT DANGERFIELD. 
Q EXCUSE ME, I MEANT DANGERFIELD; M M SORRY. 
A tHh? WAS OUR--YOU KNOW, WE ALL TRIED TO GET--WE 
BROUGHT IN ANOTHER MEMBER INTO JML, AND H M NAME WAS KENT 
.\'>w.V):;StJ du. lu i ig 
S.j ' [.axe Ci!v. i,!tan 041', 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
FULLER. AMD KENT FULLER PUT UP SOME MONEY, I PUT UP SOME 
MONEY, MIKE PUT UP SOME MONEY, AND LARRY D I D ; AND I T TOTALLED 
OUT TO $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 , WHICH WE GAVE. 
Q DO YOU RECALL HOW MUCH MONEY YOU PUT UP PERSONALLY? 
A $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 . 
Q $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 ? AND DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY THE REST 
OF THEM PUT UP? 
A I T WOULD JUST BE A GUESS. I BELIEVE THAT KENT PUT 
UP $23' , 000 AND MIKE COME UP WITH $ 1 8 , 0 0 0 , AND LARRY COME 
UP WITH THE REMAINDER. BUT THAT'S A GUESS, YOU KNOW; I KNOW 
THE AMOUNT THAT I PUT UP. 
Q OKAY. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ANY TAX RETURNS OR OTHER 
DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN F ILED FOR TAX PURPOSES FOR JML? 
A MIKE WAS HANDLING THAT PART OF I T , AND I BELIEVE 
THE ATTORNEY VMS GREEN, A /4AN NAMED GREEN. I DON'T KNOW 
HIS FIRST NAME. 
MR. MADSEN: JOHN? JOHN GREEN IN THE JUDGE 
BUILDING? 
A WELL, IT - -GREEN WAS HIS NAME, AND MIKE HAD TO HIRE j 
H i M. . j 
O DID THEY EVER GIVE YOU ANY SCHEDULES FROM JML THAT | 
YCU F.LSi VvfTH YOUR TAX RETURNS THAT SHOWED THIS INVESTMENT { 
ANN HOW IV WOULD BE TREATED FOR TAX PURPOSES, I F YOU CAN ! 
J 
A NO, 7 JUST HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE. MIKE HANDLED I T , A N D - - . ! 
! 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY PARTNERSHIP DOCUMENTS OF JML AT 
THIS TIME? 
A NO, I DON'T. IN FACT LARRY OR MIKE OR GREEN HAS 
THEM. I DON'T HAVE. 
Q OKAY. I IMAGINE IT TOOK SOME PERIOD OF TIME TO 
GET ALL OF THIS ORGANIZED AND PUT TOGETHER, AND MOST OF THAT 
TIME WAS SPENT IN THE SPRING Or 1980; 13 THAT A FAIR 
STATEMENT? 
A THE FIRST TIME THAT I WAS IN CONTACT WITH MCDONALD 
WAS IN APRIL OR--CL05E TO THAT PERIOD OF TIME, AND WE HAD 
I: 
Ji !! FROM THEN UNTIL--IT WAS TWO OR THREE MONTHS, YOU KNOW. 
II 
12 ;i OF COURSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT DATE WE HAD THE 
CORPORATION FORMED OR THE JML. I HAD APPROACHED MIKE AND 
LARRY AFTER I HAD TALKED TO MCDONALD. 
Q DID YOU KNOW THE NAMES OF ANY OF THE OTHER PEOPLE 
WHO WERE PUTTING MONEY INTO THIS, INTO THE INVESTMENT IN 
THIS BUILDING? 
A I UNDERSTOOD IT WAS MCCOY, SITZBERGER, MCDONALD, 
BOLDON, AND PAUL LANDES. 
|j Q DID YOU EVER HEAR THE NAME "PARK CITY INVESTORS I" 
i ;i 
o \ 
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 || DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME? 
A NO, BUT I KNOW OF IT NOW. AT THAT TIME I COULDN'T 
23 U TELL YOU WHETHER I HAD OR NOT. I COULD HAVE, 3UT--. 
I] 
- ji Q OKAY, WERE YOU EVER PROVIDED A COPY OF A JOINT 
5
 j| VENTURE AGREEMENT THAT HAD THE NAME :'FARMSWORTH DEVELOPMENT" 
il 
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EXAM GY KINGHORN 
Ij 
1 'I Q WELL., I MEAN, LET'S LOOK AT THE LAST PAGE OF THIS 
2 || ADDENDUM. THIS HAS THE SANE SIGNATURES ON THE SAME SIGNATURE 
I | 
3 |i PAGES AS THE MAIN BUILDING CONTRACT ITSELF; ISN'T THAT 
|l 
4 j! CORRECT? 
i! 
5 !! A YES. 
6 |J Q WELL, I CAN'T SEE ANY DIFFERENCE. 
7 j! MR. MAD SEN: NO. • 
| I 
8 ij A NO, LARRY SIGNED AND I SIGNED. 
; <: 
9 jJ Q OKAY. AND THAT WAS--THAT BUILDING CONSTRUCTION 
10 Ij CONTRACT THAT'S PART OF EXHIBIT 110 IS AN AGREEMENT THAT 
f i 
M 
11 II GOVERNED YOUR ACTIVITIES AS A CONTRACTOR . IN PHYSICALLY 
12 i| ERECTING THE BUILDING AND BRINGING IN THE SUBCONTRACTORS 
13 |j AND GETTING PAID FOR ALL OF THAT; IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT? 
I J 
14 <\ A ' YES, 
ii 
1 5
 |j Q OKAY. WAS THE BUILDING STARTED WHEN THIS CONTRACT 
1 6
 j! WAS SIGNED? ' 
. i 
A YES, WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN WAS GRANTED, 
THAT'S WHEN THIS WAS SIGNED, THE SAME DAY. BEFORE WE 
SIGNED THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN, THOUGH, THEY READ THIS OVER. 
*u j| THERE WAS--I THINK MCCOY READ IT, BOLDON READ IT, AND 
fex
 'I MCDONALD. 
^ ;! AND WE WENT OVER IT, BECAUSE THERE WAS A QUESTION 
on l'| • ... • 
"" ;j Oh T;;E PROFIT ON IT, THE TOTAL AMOUNT. 
• MR. MADSEN; THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE 
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Q I ' LL FOLLOW UP. 
A NO. 
Q WHAT WAS THE QUESTION ABOUT THE PROFITS THAT CAME 
UP THAT YOU JUST TESTIFIED ABOUT? YOU SAID SOME QUESTION 
CAME UP ABOUT THE PROFIT ON IT, AND CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT 
THAT? 
A WELL,, I THOUGHT WE WAS SPEAKING ON THIS CONTRACT. 
ON THIS CONTRACT THERE WAS A CROSSED-OUT--IT HAD BEEN 
CROSSED OUT, YOU KNOW. I FIGURED WHEN I TYPED THE CONTRACT 
UP I WAS FIGURING THE PROFIT ON $87 5,000. 
0 OKAY. 
A BECAUSE I HAD NO IDEA WHAT THE BANK WAS GOING TO 
HOLD BACK AND WHAT THERE WOULD BE IN THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN 
ITSELF. . • '.- ' :  . 
Q OKAY. i -v. ' 
A AND USUALLY I TAKE MY PROFIT FROM THE HARD COST 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION, AND THIS IS WHERE WE WORKED THIS OUT 
AND DERIVED THIS OTHER FIGURE FROM THAT FIGURE AFTER I . 
HAD ALL THE INFORMATION IN FRONT OF ME. 
Q OKAY. SO THIS FIGURE THAT WAS WRITTEN IN HERE 
ON PAGE 4 OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, IF I CAN READ IT 
UPSIDE DOWN, IS—TriEREfS A FIGURE THERE FOR THE MAIN COST 
?
 J| OF THE BUILDING, WHICH LOOKS LIKE $797,000, 
t !i 
=
 ;| AND THEN IT SAYS, "PLUS PROFIT AND OVERHEAD OF,?~-IS 
11 
5
 |! THAT $80, 253? 
ii 
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EXAM 3Y KINGHORN 
A WELL, THAT INCLUDED —LLrT ' S SEE IF I CAN — THIS 
$ 8 0 , 2 5 0 INCLUDED THE PROFIT AND OVERHEAD TO THE COMB I NED--NOW, 
IT SEEMED TO ME LIKE THE PROFIT, THAT WAS $ 72,000, AND THE 
OVERHEAD WAS $7,5 00 OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. AND IT 
TOTALED THE $8 0 , 2 5 3 . 
AND 1 GOT THAT FROM—AFTER I FOUND OUT THIS FIGURE 
OF $79 7 , 0 0 0 . 
Q SO YOUR PROFIT WAS INTENDED TO BE ROUGHLY 10 PERCENT 
OF THE HARD COST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A RIGHT, AND THAT'S WHAT I FIGURED; 10 PERCENT OF THE 
HARD COST. 
Q OKAY. BEFORE YOU SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT OR GOT THE 
CONSTRUCTION LOAN, HAD YOU GONE UP TO PARK CITY AND KNOCKED 
DOWN ANY OF THE OLD HOUSES OR DONE ANY CLEARING WORK OR 
ANY EXCAVATION OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT ON THE PROPERTY? 
A NONE WHATSOEVER. I HAD LOOKED AT THE PROPERTY, 
AMD I HAD CONTACTED THEM, MY SUBS, TO SEE WHAT I HAD. 
MY EXCAVATOR HAD SEEN THE PROPERTY SO WE COULD SEE 
ABOUT WHAT WE HAD TO DO TO REMOVE THE OLD HOUSES THAT WAS 
ON "r!E PROPERTY AND LEVEL IT. 
Q WAS THERE A PORTION OF YOUR ESTIMATE THAT WAS 
AL.L.\ A;,ATED TO THE DEMOLITION OF THE OLD HOUSES AND SO FORTH? 
*St) il A 
vKAV , 
NOW, I DON'" KNOW WHAT THAT WOULD BE. IT WAS A TOTAL 
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EXAM BY JEFFS 
A NO, I WAS NOT. 
Q HOW WAS IT YOU LEARNED ABOUT IT? 
A THEY SUED ME. THEY PRESENTED ME WITH A SUMMONS 
SUING ME FOR HALF A MILLION DOLLARS FOP. FILING AN ILLEGAL 
LIEN. 
Q AND YOU LEARNED ABOUT THEIR BOND IN CONNECTION 
WITH THAT PROCEEDING? ' : 
A EVIDENTLY THROUGH THE PROCESS OF THIS.THIS WAS 
LEARNED. I DON'T—YES, IT WAS LEARNED THROUGH MY ATTORNEYS 
WHO LEARNED THIS, WHAT KIND OF A BOND THEY HAD POSTED. ; > 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, GOING BACK. TO THE TIME: FROM THE 
PERIOD OF TIME WHEN YOU COMPLETED YOUR CONTRACT FOR THE •.-;;. 
CONSTRUCTION, DID YOU AT THAT TIME CLAIM SOME INTEREST IN 
THE PROPERTY IN TERMS OF OWNERSHIP? BY THAT I' MEAN NOT 
BY REASON OF YOUR ,CONSTRUCT ION CONTRACT BUT 3Y REASON OF 
SOME OWNERSHIP IN THE JML—. 
A JOINT VENTURE? YES, SIR. WE CLAIMED 20 PERCENT IN 
THAT PROJECT IN THE JOINT VENTURE, JML DID. 
Q OKAY, JML CLAIMED 20 PERCENT OWNERSHIP? 
A YES. ' • ; -.: . ... :.. 
AND YOU CLAIMED OWNERSHIP IN JML; IS THAT RIGHT? 
YES. 
NOW, AND I BELIEVE YOU SAID THAT DANGERFIELD AND 
.AftR? LIHNELl WSRK THE OTHER TWO PARTNERS IN JML;,: IS THAT 
Q 
A 
?4 IN-
CORRECT? 
I i 
Ii 
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A AND KENT FULLER. 
Q AND KENT FULLER. OKAY. AND THAT WAS--WAS THAT 
A L IM ITED PARTNERSHIP OR A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP? 
A I REALLY CAN'T TELL YOU, BECAUSE I J U S T - - A L L I C A N -
I T ' S A PARTNERSHIP, AND MY CONCERN WAS NOT REALLY WITH THAT. 
I MEAN I INVESTED IN I T . I WAS TOLD THAT WE COULD MAKE A, 
SUBSTANTIAL PROFIT ON THE B U I L D I N G , AND MY CONCERN WAS PUTTING 
THAT BUILDING UP AND DOING THE BEST JOB THAT I COULD DO IN 
THE BUILDING IN HOPES FOR MORE WORK, A FUTURE. 
Q I BELIEVE YOU SAID THAT LATER THERE WAS A DISCUSSION 
BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARTNERS IN JML ABOUT TRANSFERRING OR 
DEEDING THAT INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY TO MICHAEL MCCOY, AND 
THAT AS YOU MET TOGETHER YOU DID NOT FAVOR MAKING THE 
TRANSFER AND THEY D I D ; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES, THAT IS RIGHT. MY FAITH HAD DIMINISHED 
SLIGHTLY WITH MCCOY AND I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU TAKE AND 
HAND HIM THE WHOLE BASKET WITHOUT AT LEAST HAVING YOUR HAND 
ON THE HANDLE. 
Q NOW, I GATHER, HOWEVER, FROM WHAT YOU'VE S A I D , 
THAT AFTER THAT MEETING WHEN YOUR PARTNERS SAID THEY WANTED 
TO DO THAT, YOU ALLOWED THAT TO BE DONE? 
A THEY ONLY .NEEDED TWO SIGNATURES. 
Q SO THEY COULD BIND YOU BY THEIR SIGNATURES? 
A YES, S I R . I GUESS THAT'S WHAT THEY COULD. I 
REALLY DON'T KNOW, BUT THAT'S—FROM WHAT I ' V E UNDERSTOOD 
?=NPRAL COURT REPORTERS 
rDALE J. 
JOHNSON 
'^ASSOCIATES 
Suae 7Q0 
Nevviiouse DtniOirig 
Salt Lake C.ty. Utah Cy\ ; ' ) 
:301) 363-2000 
70 
MANAGING PARTNER 
Edward PIV!idgley, UP 
